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Article 9

MAY JUDGES EVER NULLIFY THE LAW?
M.B.E. Smith*
Several years ago I offered a brief course in jurisprudence to a
class of some twenty-five Massachusetts judges-a daunting experience since I had often appeared before many of them as a lowly criminal defender.' Inevitably, discussion came round to the question,
'Vhat should a judge do when the law dictates an unjust result?" I
had concocted a hypothetical case to spur discussion, but the class was
much more taken with the actual experience of one of its own, which
had received considerable attention in the local papers. He had presided over a bench trial in which the defendant, a high school student
with no prior record, sold a single marijuana cigarette for five dollars
to a friend while on school property. The student was charged with
distributing marijuana in a school zone, a crime carrying a two year
mandatory minimum sentence in a county house of corrections. 2 The
judge believed this punishment to be unjustly harsh, and the experience greatly troubled him. Still, believing himself bound to follow the
law, he quelled his qualms, found the student guilty, and imposed the
3
two year sentence.
The class sympathized with his plight and generally agreed that
he had done what was right, both legally and morally. Only one judge
seemed perturbed. He explored possibilities for evading the law's
rigor, suggesting inter alia that the trial judge might have found the
student guilty but also have held that the two year mandatory mini* Professor of Philosophy, Smith College. Many passages-perhaps as much as
a third of this Article-are taken from my paper: M.B.E. Smith, Do Appellate Courts
Regularly Cheat?, 16 CiuM. Jusr. ETHics 11, 11-19 (2, Summer/Fall 1997). These are
reprinted by permission of the Institute for Criminal Justice Ethics, 899 Tenth
Avenue, New York, NY 10019-1029.
1 The six-hour course was offered at Smith College in 1996, under the auspices
of the FlaschnerJudicial Institute of Boston. I must thank the participants, who were
wonderfully lively and engaged. Particular thanks are owed to Hon.John M. Greaney,
AssociateJustice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, who first suggested the
course and who made it possible.
2

See MAss. GE'. LAws ch. 94C,

§ 32J (1995).

3 These are the facts I remember from class; I have made no attempt to verify
them.
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mum violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. But everyone saw this to be futile: the prosecution would appeal and the Supreme Judicial Court would never ratify
any such constitutional claim. 4 Significantly, no one in the class
thought that the trial judge ought to have "nullified" the law-to have
entered a nonappealable verdict of "not guilty." I did not conduct a
poll, but there appeared to be a clear consensus in the class that
judges have an absolute moral obligation to follow the law and to disregard any contrary claim ofjustice. The judge who had sought a way
to temper the law's rigor noted wryly that similar reasoning had led
Lemuel Shaw-a hero to Massachusetts judges-to suppress his wellknown abolitionist sympathies and to approve the rendition of fugitive
slaves. 5 But his remark did not resonate with the others, and the class
period soon ended.
The consensus among the class that judges are always legally and
morally bound to follow the law is undoubtedly the conventional wisdom among legal scholars and laypeople alike. It was my own view
before I began legal practice, before I became persuaded that appellate courts regularly "cheat" or "nullify" the law. I have recently explained in anotherjoumal why I now believe thatjudicial nullification
is a common empirical phenomenon; and my argument here will
build upon that explanation. 6 My thesis there is quickly summed:
although the available evidence is entirely anecdotal-I describe in
detail only two cases wherein I claim unmistakable appellate cheating-it is nonetheless reasonable to believe that appellate courts often
decide early on what they will do with a case and thereafter deliberately ignore inconvenient facts and even settled rules of law in order
to obtain the desired result. What I described was not the oft-debated
phenomenon of courts making new law.7 Nullification suspends in4

See Commonwealth v. Cowan, 664 N.E.2d 425 (Mass. 1996) (reversing a trial

court that imposed a less severe sentence than the mandatory minimum of one year
in a house of corrections that was prescribed for illegally possessing a firearm.)
Cowan also held "[i]t is well within [the Supreme Judicial Court's] general superintendence power [under MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (1986)] to correct a sentence

that has been imposed contrary to law." Id. at 427.
5

See Thomas Sim's Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285 (1851).

6 This Article attempts to convey the point of view of an appellate attorney unpleasantly surprised by the phenomenon: it's hard then to avoid feeling as though

one has been cheated of a well-earned victory. But here, following Kent Greenawalt, I
shall use the less loaded word "nullification." See infra note 14.
7 For a lively recent salvo in this old jurisprudential fight, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRIsoNs

(1998).
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tact some part of the law that applies to a particular case; it leaves that
law unchanged.
My encounters with appellate nullification have primarily been in
criminal cases and follow this clear pattern: when an appellant argues
for reversal of his conviction on the basis of technical rules of procedure or evidence, and when the trial record suggests probable guilt,
the reviewing court will often deliberately evade or ignore those rules
and will dismiss the appeal. Although I have encountered nullification in at least one civil appeal, I have had insufficient experience to
discern recurrent factual patterns. However, my hypothesis is the obvious generalization from my and other appellate attorneys' experiences, viz., that judicial nullification will tend to occur whenever
judges are confident that the facts of a case and its governing law yield
a morally undesirable result but also believe that that law ought not be
changed.
Others before me have made a similar suggestion. The issue was
first broached by Sanford and Mortimer Kadish in their book, Discretion to Disobey,8 wherein they argued that many legal roles are what
they dubbed "recourse roles." 9 Such roles permit their holders to disregard parts of the law when this will better secure their roles' ends of
doing justice than would strict compliance with it all. (The Kadishes'
most immediately persuasive example is jury nullification in criminal
cases: since Bushell's Case'° in 1670, Anglo-American juries have had
both power and right to acquit in the teeth of the law and may not be
punished for their verdict.)" The Kadishes also suggested that judging is a recourse role: thatjudges have legal power and moral right to
disregard the law when doing so leads to a better or a more just result. 1 2 However, pleading insufficient evidence-judging is a hard activity to observe and one often cannot take at face value what judges
say about it-they disclaimed having made their suggestion "stick."' 3
Kent Greenawalt has also discussed judicial nullification, albeit
not in great detail. In Conflicts of Law and Morality,14 in the course of
8 MORTIMER IL KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DIscRETIoN TO DISOBEY.A STUDY
OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES (1973). I hereby disavow criticisms made
of that book in my review, M.B.E. Smith, ConcerningLawful Illegality, 83 YALE LJ. 1534
(1974) (reviewing KADISH & KADISH, supra note 8). The review makes some useful
observations about the concept of obligation but is wholly mistaken in thinking these
inconsistent with the Kadishes' enterprise.
9 KADISH & KADISH, supranote 8.
10 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
11 M
12 KADIsH & KADISH, supra note 8, at 85-91.

13 Id. at 90.
14

KENT GREENAWALT,

CoNFLuCrs OF LAW AND

MORAL=v (1987).
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discussing the many techniques available to various legal actors for
ameliorating the law's usual rigor, he points out (what every practicing lawyer viscerally knows) that judges at every level have a de facto
power to nullify the law, both in criminal and civil matters. 1 5 Judges
most easily exercise this power when they make findings of fact, which
rarely are disturbed or even closely examined by appellate courts. But
if a fact finder has unfettered discretion, she may tailor her findings as
she pleases. Hence, the law may effectively be nullified by ajudge who
knowingly plugs fictive facts into correct doctrine in order to obtain a
particular result. Patent nullification of legal doctrine is more risky
for a trial judge because it is more easily shown on appeal-and
judges dislike being reversed. Nonetheless, patent nullification of law
may not be worth appealing as appeals are expensive and rarely succeed. Perhaps in part this is because appellate courts often ratify trial
court nullification or else nullify the law themselves. Appellate courts
do not like to reverse rulings made below even when they think them
in error; and they will not reverse them if they think they can see some
reasonable alternative.
Greenawalt allows that judicial nullification may sometimes be
morally and legally permissible, for example, when, as in the judge's
dilemma above, a mandatory minimum sentence is unduly harsh:
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that some convictions would be so
abhorrent that judicial defiance of the law would be defensible, and
this conclusion may be true even if such action is considered to be
outside the law in every sense. Given the judge's greater understanding of the law, its values may more fully inform his or her evaluation of possible justifications for nullification than will be true for
jurors. Both because of the nature of the office and because they
usually find a way of mitigating the rigors of the law through their
sentencing power, judges will need much more powerful reasons
than juries to engage in outright nullification. 16
His conclusion appears to be that judges at all levels have wideranging power to nullify the law but that they ought almost never exercise it, except perhaps in the kind of case that briefly troubled my
class ofjudges. Nonetheless, while his view is theoretically more complex than that of my judges, one would expect both opinions to work
out much the same in practice; whereas the judges took themselves to
be absolutely obligated to follow the law, Greenawalt supposes instead
that they have only a strong presumptive reason. But because it
15 See id&at 368. This paragraph amplifies Greenawalt's terse discussion. In particular, it is my contention that appellate courts often ratify trial court nullification.
16 See id.
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trumps virtually all opposing moral or legal considerations, it approaches being an absolute reason against nullification.
However, my empirical hypothesis that courts regularly engage in
nullification of law suggests that judges' permissible reasons for decision are more complex than Greenawalt allows. I suppose that nullification is both legally and morally permissible; I assume that judges'
ordinary practices cannot be unlawful and are unlikely to be immoral
(at least within tolerably just legal systems). However, the ready availability of nullification as ajudicial technique presents ajurisprudential
challenge both for Greenawalt and for my class of judges. If courts
regularly nullify parts of the law when these dictate morally untoward
results, why shouldn't they nullify the law whenever it so speaks? If
the courts regularly nullify procedural law to ensure that the guilty do
not escape punishment, why should they shrink from nullification
when application of the law results in an unjustly harsh criminal
sanction?
I.
But there is work to be done before we can approach these questions. In particular, we must test my easy assumption thatjudicial nullification must be morally acceptable if it often occurs. Are there
grounds to condemn it? Let us deploy this two-pronged test, derived
from the intuition that the wrongness of any governmental action can
always be explained either as a violation of rights or a disservice to the
public good. If it is wrong for courts to nullify the law, then nullification must either violate one or more background moral rights held by
17
particular citizens (i.e., rights that are independent of positive law)
or else it must have on balance bad consequences for the public weal.
As for nullification's impact on rights, the only persons who
might possibly be wronged are adversely affected litigants, and perhaps their attorneys. But a moment's reflection confirms that a lawyer's right to any particular judicial decision must devolve from her
client's. Hence, the only interesting question is whether nullification
must always violate the background rights of a losing litigant. But
rather than discussing this question abstractly, let us instead look at a
particular case. In my article, I claimed to have proven deductively
that my client, George,' 8 was cheated out of an important constitu17 I here rely upon Ronald Dworkin's useful distinction between background
rights and institutional rights. See RONALD DwoRKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
101-05 (1978). For the best recent theory of the nature and scope of our background
rights, see JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, TiE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
18 I have changed the names of those involved to protect their anonymity.
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tional right-or rather, that the Massachusetts Appeals Court had nullified the law in his case. The right denied him was his Sixth
Amendment right to an attorney in a criminal proceeding against
him. He was forced to trial pro se after he unreasonably rejected appointed counsel and demanded that another be given him.
The right to counsel has always been considered a paramount
constitutional guarantee. None is more jealously guarded, for it is
one of the few rights exempted from the "harmless error" rule. (This
doctrine, established in Chapman v. California,1 9 permits appellate
courts to reject criminal appeals even though fundamental constitutional error occurred at trial. If the reviewing court discovers that a
criminal defendant not only did not obtain a garden-variety right but
also determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
cause the conviction-i.e., that a reasonable jury would yet have convicted had the error not happened-then it will stand.) George had
a clear legal right to a new trial, but had he also a background moral
right? Did he suffer an injustice when his legal right was nullified?
Our analysis must begin with the fact that George was undeniably
guilty of the offenses with which he was charged: viz., of unarmed robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot),
larceny of a motor vehicle, and driving to endanger. At the trial the
victim confidently identified George as the one who knocked him
down, kicked him, snatched his car keys, and drove off in his car. The
jury was also told of an earlier firm identification: at a show-cause
hearing the victim had picked out George seated at the back of a
crowded courtroom. Worst of all, about three hours after the robbery
and thirty miles from it, George drove the victim's car through a red
light into another vehicle. He was thereupon carried to a hospital and
from there to a jail. Before the trial, Judge M took great pains to
inquire into George's reasons for wishing to discharge his trial attorney, Michael. Judge M questioned Michael closely about the lapses
George alleged against him and about his preparation for trial. During this colloquy, which lasted about an hour, neither George nor
Michael ever spoke of any witness who could have cast a reasonable
doubt upon the Commonwealth's case.
Because his claim is exempted from harmless error analysis,
George's guilt was legally irrelevant to his right to a new trial. But it
was plainly relevant to whether he was done an injustice by being denied it. Our moral intuition is that those charged with crimes have an
important background right to a trial that fairly tests whether they
were guilty, but that they have no right to a "perfect" trial-to one
19

386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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that is altogether free of any procedural error. (The harmless error
rule is the institutional expression of this intuition.) Any experienced
criminal defender who had read the trial record would realize that no
attorney could have prevailed over the Commonwealth's proof and
that George's guilt was fairly shown. Hence, George's background
moral rights seem to have been fully satisfied.
Let us now turn to our test's public weal prong: Were the consequences of nullifying George's constitutional right good or ill? It had
a few clearly disutile consequences-the decision deeply disappointed
George and flummoxed his appellate attorney. But it is hard to think
of anything else. The cost of confining him for many years does not
seem fairly chargeable to nullifying his right to counsel, because had
he been granted a new trial he would almost certainly have again been
convicted. In any event, because his lengthy probation record comprises many serious crimes, it appears that George has few life skills
apart from crime; hence, the cost of confining him must have soon
been recouped in its benefit to those whom he would have victimized
had he remained at large. Yet another good consequence was to
spare Massachusetts the expense of a new trial and the public the very
20
slight risk that George might somehow be acquitted and set free.
Most importandy--this is a point I did not soon come to appreciatethe Appeals Court's denying George a new trial by nullifying his right
to counsel left the law in a better state than had it reached the same
result by dealing straightforwardly with his legal claims. But to see this
we must look closely at the legal issues posed by George's case and at
how the Appeals Court dealt with them.
Before ordering him to trial pro se, Judge M found that George
had waived his right to counsel by rejecting Michael-despite the fact
that he expressly denied that he was relinquishing "any of the rights
afforded [him]," and that throughout his trial he continually demanded counsel and never once attempted to defend himself. Judge
M's finding was counter-intuitive. The concept of waiver is a root
legal notion familiar to every first-year law student, and it is everywhere defined as "the intentional [or voluntary] relinquishment of a
known right."2 1 How could George have voluntarily relinquished his
right to counsel when he continually insisted, in evident sincerity, that
20 George might have won at a new trial if the victim had suddenly died before it
could occur. It is possible that his testimony at the first trial might be deemed inadmissible at a second trial on ground of its "unreliability"-viz., that having wrongly
been denied counsel George had had no "adequate" opportunity to cross examine

the witness. See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 434 N.E.2d 163 (Mass. 1982).
21 Rose v. Regan, 181 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Mass 1962) (citations omitted). Accord
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding a waiver of a constitutional
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he was not doing any such thing? How can anyone intentionally give
up a trial right while being forced over one's protests to proceed without it?
Nonetheless, Judge M's finding was supported by substantial authority. A line of Massachusetts cases recite the principle, culled from
a First Circuit decision, Maynard v. Meachum,2 2 that "a refusal without
good cause to proceed with able appointed counsel is a 'voluntary'
waiver [of the right to counsel]."2

Moreover, a reported Appeals

Court decision, Commonwealth v. Moran,24 was in all essentials identical
to George's: Moran too was forced to trial pro se over his protest after
he had unreasonably rejected appointed counsel; and his conviction
was upheld on the ground that he had waived counsel.
However, what Judge M had not discovered was that Moran had
been effectively overruled on the issue of implied waiver by a later
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth v. Tuitt,25 and
its companion in the First Circuit, Tuitt v. Fair,26 which denied Tuitt's
petition for habeas corpus after his direct appeal had failed. Despite
seemingly significant factual differences, Tuitt's cases fit oddly well
with Moran and with George's. Tuitt too had attempted to discharge
his appointed attorney on the eve of trial and had demanded that
other counsel be furnished to him. However, unlike Moran or
George, Tuitt also demanded that he be permitted to serve as his own
attorney. Also, Tuitt's judge did not force him to go on pro se, but
rather ordered him to trial with his original appointed attorney.
When Tuitt appealed and petitioned for habeas corpus, he gave
up railing against trial counsel. He instead argued that he had
wrongly been denied his right of self-representation, a fundamental
constitutional right first recognized by the Supreme Court in Farettav.
California.27 To counter the obvious rejoinder that one cannot simultaneously have the right to be represented by an attorney and also the
right to represent oneself, Tuitt ingeniously claimed that he had
waived his right to counsel, on the ground that he too fell within the
Maynard v. Meachum principle that "a refusal without good cause to
proceed with able, appointed counsel is a 'voluntary' waiver [of the
right must be voluntary). To see the ubiquity of this definition of "waiver," see its

entry in any edition of BLAcK's LAW DIGrnONARY.
22
23
24
25
26
27

545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
457 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
473 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. 1985).
822 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1987).
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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right to counsel] ."28 Tuitt's argument was bold and brash but unavailing. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court retorted, "[T]his
[principle of implied waiver] is generally true, except in those situations where refusal to proceed with counsel is accompanied by an explicit refusal to waive one's right to counsel."2 9 The First Circuit
agreed, saying,
[T] he right to an attorney is in effect until waived, while the alternative right to self-representation is not in effect until asserted. Where
the two rights are in collision, the nature of the two rights makes it
reasonable to favor the right to counsel which, if denied, leaves the
average defendant helpless.30
Tuitt remained in state prison. But the principles articulated in
his cases gave powerful support to George's demand for a new trial.
George did explicitly refuse to waive his right to counsel- Tuitt holds
that such a refusal precludes waiver-therefore, George couldn't have
waived this right. The facts of George's case and the holding of Tuitt
strictly imply the conclusion. Logicians call this argument form modus
ponens.3x Clearly then, Judge M had been mistaken. What he should
have done was to hold Michael in the case for as long as George demanded counsel. Forcing George to trial pro se had deprived him of
his right to counsel, which (according to ChiefJustice Rehnquist) "re32
quires automatic reversal of [his] conviction."
When I composed George's brief, I thought I had constructed an
air-tight legal argument for reversal of his conviction-and indeed I
still do. I confidently expected to win the appeal, and I was flabbergasted and outraged when I lost. The Appeals Court summarily dismissed George's appeal pursuant to its Rule 1:28, which permits it by
written order to "affirm, modify, or reverse the action of the court
below" if it has found inter alia "that no substantial question of law is
presented by the appeal."3 3 In such cases, the court's order is unpub28 Tuit, 473 N.E.2d. at 1109 (citing Maynard v. Meachura, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st
Cir. 1976)).
29 See id.at 1109. This principle was not mere dicta but was essential to Tuitts
holding; since Tuitt expressly demanded his right of self-representation, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could only escape the conclusion that he was denied
it by holding that it had never "clicked in," on the ground that he had never waived
counsel.
30 Fair, 822 F.2d at 174 (citation omitted).
31 The argument's formal structure (ignoring quantifier complications) is: "If p
[George refused to waive his right to counsel], and if p then q [If a defendant refuses
to waive counsel, then he has not waived it], then q [George did not waive counsel]."
32 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)).
33 MASS.APP. CT. R. OF APP. PRAc. 1:28.
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lished, is circulated only to the parties, and has no weight as precedent. After expending half its twelve pages reciting the procedural
history and most of the essential facts of the case, the court began its
legal analysis by noting that George's appeal was based on Tuitt. It
even quoted the Tuitt exception to the doctrine of implied waiver.
34
But then the court straight-away turned to Commonwealth v. Moran.
After describing this case and its holding at some length, the Court
abruptly announced, "[W] e conclude that the present circumstances
are controlled by the Moran opinion."3 5 It made no attempt to show
that George's waiver of counsel had been voluntary or intentional;
neither did it articulate a concept of unintentional or involuntary
waiver. Apparently the court would have conceded-the trial transcript made the fact undeniable-that George had continually voiced
his demand for counsel. But it made no attempt to distinguish Tuitt,
to explain how Tuitt's demand for another attorney would preclude
his waiving his right to counsel but George's demand would not.
Neither did the Appeals Court even mention the federal case, Tuitt v.
Fair.
I trust that the fallacy in the Appeals Court's opinion is obvious:
Tuitt and Moran are inconsistent holdings-by which I mean "inconsistent" in the logician's sense of implying a contradiction. Moran
stands for the proposition that a person may be forced to trial pro se
over his express demand for counsel and yet still be counted as having
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Tuitt stands for the proposition that a defendant who expressly demands to be afforded counsel
cannot be held to have waived the right to counsel. These propositions are flatly inconsistent; by the canons of logic they cannot both be
true. Since Tuitt is the later decision and emerged from a higher
court, it must prevail. Hence, Moran was overruled on the issue of
waiver. Therefore, it cannot "control" George's or any other case on
that issue.
The court did note in a footnote that George had claimed that
Tuitt overruled Moran, saying, "Contrary to the defendant's claim,
Commonwealth v. Tuitt did not overrule the Moran case. Moran has
been cited favorably in subsequent cases. ' '36 This footnote was perhaps the most disingenuous touch of all. Moranhas been cited in postTuitt reported cases, but not once on the issue of whether a defendant's express refusal to waive counsel precludes his having done so.
34

545 F.2d 273(lst Cir. 1976).

35 Id. at 278.
36 Id.
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Tuitt even cites Moran-butagain not on the crucial issue.3 7 Lee cites
Moran twice but only to support some other principle of law.3 8 As the
Appeals Court well knew, the fact that Moran has been cited on other
issues is no reason at all to hold it to be valid authority on the issue
presented in George's case. The Court's fallacy was too blatant to
have been accidental, which I then took to be decisive evidence that it
had deliberately cheated. It had made up its collective mind that
George would not get a new trial; and it would enforce that result
regardless of what the Constitution requires.
I made these criticisms and more in a petition for rehearing addressed to the Appeals Court; and I tendered them all over again to
the Supreme Judicial Court in an application for further appellate review. Being still outraged my tone was at times intemperate-I accused the Appeals Court of deliberately ignoring settled law-and I
worried somewhat that this might draw a rebuke. However, the petition and the application were each denied with a single short sentence. George remained in state prison and I was left feeling
ridiculous.
Still, resolving to learn something from the experience, I sent off
copies of the Appeals Court's summary memorandum and order, together with my application for further appellate review filed in the
Supreme Judicial Court, to about twenty eminent legal scholars,3 9 and
I asked them whether the court's decision was as bad as I had claimed.
About half teach in law schools, the rest in philosophy departments,
and about half in each cohort responded, some at very generous
length. 40 Almost everyone agreed that Tuitt had clearly overruled Moran, and hence that the Appeals Court's decision was plainly mistaken.
I took great satisfaction from these letters. However, two law professors dissented. Both allowed that the Appeals Court's reasoning was
indefensible, but then argued (on rather different grounds) that the
decision was nonetheless sound. I didn't find their rationales convincing; but I was greatly taken aback by their conclusions, as I knew them
both to be wise and to possess a profound knowledge of the law. Soon
after, the advocate's blinders fell from my temples, and I came to believe that the Appeals Court had handled George's case in exactly the
right way.
37 Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 473 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Mass. 1985).
38 Commonwealth v. Lee, 475 N.E.2d, 363, 368 (Mass. 1985).
39 Kent Greenawalt took part in my survey and sent me very helpful comments.
40 Thanks also are owed to Professors Sandy Kadish, Andy Kaufman, Steve Munzer, George Christie, John Connolly, Jim Nickel, Gerry Postema, David Lyons, and
Brian Bix.
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I had argued in George's brief that the Court had had only one
way to dispose of his case, i.e., to grant him a new trial. In nullifying
his right to counsel, the Appeals Court in effect told me that their
options weren't so restricted. But, prompted by the law professors'
letters, it finally occurred to me that the Appeals Court had had a
third alternative: it might also have denied George a new trial by
changing the law. It might have held that the right to counsel is after
all a run-of-the-mill constitutional right, to be subjected to harmless
error analysis per Chapman, despite mistaken dicta to the contrary in
numerous Supreme Court cases. 41 At first this was an exciting
thought: all appellate attorneys want to argue before the Supreme
Court, and I wished that the Appeals Court had gone that route. But
then I wondered whether I might have won in the Supreme Court,
and upon reflection I thought it unlikely. I couldn't get around the
fact that George was unmistakeably guilty. Therefore, his conviction
couldn't have been unjust; and so, why would the Supreme Court order Massachusetts to grant him a new trial?
All this set the stage for a key question: If George's case had
reached the Supreme Court and had that court ratified the Appeals
Court's hypothetical change in the law, would that have been better
than what actually did happen? More particularly, is it better that the
right to counsel was nullified in one case or that the harmless error
rule be further widened to take it in? Once asked, the answer is obvious. Anyone who has seen how badly pro se litigants fare must believe
that a criminal defendant's right to counsel really is much more fundamental than most others, e.g., the right that the prosecutor not argue to the jury that the defendant's failure to tell the police what
happened when he was arrested is evidence of his guilt. The prosecutor's error can easily be cured by ajudge's forceful instruction to the
contrary-not so denial of the right to counsel. Judge M had shown
unusual patience with George, and he had taken extraordinary pains
to safeguard George's other trial rights or to ameliorate their loss. His
great care undoubtedly was motivated by his appreciation of how important a right he had withheld from George by forcing him to trial
pro se. The right-to-counsel's present immunity to harmless error
analysis is a constant reminder to judges of its supreme importance.
Its luster would be badly tarnished were this lost. Nullification is
sometimes plainly the best overall judicial strategy.

41 For instances of such dicta, see supranote 27; see also Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).
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II.
We may generalize from George's case: judicial nullification is
both lawful and morally permissible when it violates no citizen's background rights and when it has on balance better consequences than
the court's following the law or attempting to change it. I suppose
these to be sufficient conditions for permissible nullification, rather
than necessary ones. Nonetheless, even this weak test sheds light on
our initial example. Remember the facts: the judge imposed a two
year mandatory minimum sentence upon a high'school student with
no prior record for selling a single marijuana cigarette to a friend on
school property, when he might have nullified the law by issuing a
nonappealable "not guilty" verdict. Would the latter course have been
lawful and morally permissible?
Note first that the "background rights" prong of our test is here
even more strongly satisfied than in George's case. There the test applied symmetrically in that the Appeals Court might either have followed the law or nullified it (as it did) without violating anyone's
background rights. But the test applies asymmetrically in the student
example. As in George's case, the judge would have violated no rights
had he nullified the law: even though the student's guilt was clear, no
one had a background right that he be found guilty and the
mandatory minimum imposed; no one would have been wronged had
the judge nullified the law. On the other hand, it is plausible to suppose that by following the law the judge violated an important right,
viz., that of the student not to suffer punishment which is wildly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense. Judged by its performance
on the "background rights" prong of our test, the student joint-seller
example seems an even stronger candidate for legitimate nullification
than was George's case.
Let us now speculate about the consequences of the judge's alternatives upon the public weal, beginning with the one he chose. Apart
from satisfying the particular prosecutors and police who brought the
charge before the court, it is hard to believe that the judge's following
the law could have had many good results. One doubts that media
reports of the student's incarceration had much of a deterrent effect
upon local pot smokers or dealers. It is instead the kind of news story
that offends the public's inchoate sense of justice, thereby feeding
mistrust and cynicism of the law.42 Moreover,the cost of the student's

confinement was probably a dead-weight social loss: because he had
42

Some readers may be inclined to scoff at the notion of a "sense" ofjustice. I

commend them to M.B.E. Smith, The Best Intuitionistic Theory Yet, 11 Ctm. Jusr. EHics 85.
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no prior record, he probably would not have had victims had he remained at large, so there was no off-setting benefit to the public from
his incapacitation.
Suppose next that the judge had attempted to change the law,
and he had failed. This is his worst alternative: it has all the bad consequences of following the law, and he also would have felt like a fool.
But suppose instead success: suppose the judge had found the student
guilty yet refused to impose the sentence, perhaps offering an Eighth
Amendment rationale for invalidating the offending provisions of the
"school zone" statute. And suppose as well that the Supreme Judicial
Court and the Supreme Court had ratified his decision. Would that
have left the law in a better state than its nullification? Even those
who most hate mandatory minimum sentences and who think that the
''war on drugs" has gotten "way out of hand" should hesitate before
saying "yes." Despite the Eighth Amendment and like language in
state constitutions, American courts traditionally defer to the authority of legislatures to fix punishments for the various crimes that they
define. 43 Mandatory sentencing schemes may sometimes work injustices, but probably most often they do not.44 Invalidation of the
school zone statute would have been a bold assertion ofjudicial power
which might well have prompted legislative retaliation. It would have
been a risky way of protecting the student's right.
Nullifying the law and returning a "not guilty" verdict seems
plainly the judge's least costly choice. It respects the student's right,
and it avoids the price in public disaffection paid by the judge's following the law. Otherwise, apart from flummoxing a few prosecutors
and police officers and greatly pleasing the student, his lawyer,
friends, and family, it most likely would have had no further consequences at all, good or bad. That is nullification's signal advantage: it
affects nothing beyond the present case. It could be an effective judi43 The Supreme Court's recent supervision of capital prosecutions and sentencing is the great breach in this tradition. See, for example, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), which invalidated all mandatory death sentences on the
ground that these violate convicts' background rights to be treated "as uniquely individual human beings." Id. at 304. The Court did not satisfactorily explain-nor has it
ever-why like reasoning would not invalidate all mandatory minimum sentences of
incarceration. Surely, if there really is a background right of individual treatment, it
extends farther than to proceedings in which our government proposes to kill us. It is
not sufficient merely to say that death "qualitatively" differs from confinement, so that
life imprisonment without possibility of parole can be dispensed without individual
consideration of a convict's desert and without violating his background rights.
44 But see, e.g., Timothy Egan, War on Crack Retreats, Still Taking Prisoners, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at 1 (graphically describing the many injustices caused by present mandatory minimum drug sentences).
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cial technique for ameliorating the occasional injustices caused by
mandatory sentencing schemes, and it seems a pity that it is not more
often used.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

One can easily imagine my contentions about George's and the
student pot-seller's cases encapsulated into an express legal standard.
Partially stated, it might read something like this: Permissible nullification: If a court finds 1) that nullifying the governing law of a case
better serves the public weal than its either following the law or attempting to change it, and 2) that nullifying the law will not be unjust
to or will avoid injustice to any party, then it may do so.
Were any such doctrine recognized it would join the many other
express legal standards, which also are couched in moral terms, that
can negate the effect of an otherwise decisive concatenation of facts
and doctrine. Consider Rule 30(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides, "The trial judge upon motion in
writing may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may
not have been done."45 Another example is the contract dbctrine of
promissory estoppel, which can "nullify" a want of consideration or
the Statute of Frauds and which provides, inter alia, "A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect. . is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted
may be limited asjustice requires."4 6 An express nullification doctrine
would differ from these present standards only in being more global.
Should nullification be expressly recognized as a legitimate judicial technique? The question arises naturally, but I leave it for some
other occasion. Here I insist only upon this:judicial nullification does
happen fairly often, and sometimes, upon reflection, it seems clearly
to have been the right decision.

45
46

MASS. R- CRM. P. 30(b).
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).

The full text provides,

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can only be avoided
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.
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